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For more than a decade courts have debated the scope of the addict's
criminal responsibility; today the issue remains unsettled. These de-
bates were triggered by the Supreme Court's decison in Robinson v.
California,' which recognized that narcotic addition is a "disease," and
held that criminal punishment of a person thus "afflicted" violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 2
Subsequent cases discussed the possible conflicting interpretations of
Robinson.3 All agreed that Robinson held, at the very least, that the
Constitution precludes criminal punishment of the addict simply for
a condition of body and mind manifesting a "bare desire" 4 or "mere
propensity" to use the drug. It is over the tendencies to go beyond
this "minimalist" interpretation of Robinson, however, that contro-
versy flourishes. While the major trend in the courts has been to in-
terpret Robinson in the minimalist way,6 some courts have argued for
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1. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
2. Id. at 666-67.
3. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 171 (1963), appeal dismissed for lack of juris., 377 U.S. 406 (1964); State v. Margo, 40
N.J. 188, 191 A.2d 43 (1963).
4. 370 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 543 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
6. United States v. Rundle, 429 F.2d 1316 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (conviction for
unlawful use of drugs is not punishment for addiction); Bailey v. United States, 386 F.2d
1 (5th Cir. 1967) (no error in refusal to charge that addiction is disease creating compulsion
under which defendant is not criminally responsible); United States ex rel. Swanson v.
Reincke, 344 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965) (statute prohibiting self-
administration of narcotic drugs held constitutional); People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d
903, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1963), appeal dismissed for lack of juris., 377 U.S. 406 (1964) (im-
prisonment for possession of heroin for personal use not cruel and unusual punishment);
Nutter v. State, 8 Md. App. 635, 262 A.2d 80 (1970) (addicts may be criminals because
responsible for acts such as possession and control of a narcotic drug which are crimes
even though they stem from the addiction); People v. Borrero, 19 N.Y.2d 332, 227 N.E.2d
18, 280 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1967) (penal sanction applied to addicts who committed crimes
solely to procure money to purchase drugs not cruel and unusual punishment); State v.
Margo, 40 N.J. 188, 191 A.2d 43 (1963) (punishment for being "under the influence" of
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extension of exculpation 7 to crimes related to addiction.
Arguments of this type appear in recent decisions in the District of
Columbia, and in a number of powerfully argued dissents in cases
decided by narrow majorities." They claim either that the addict's use
of the drug and some or all related offenses are inseparable from the
addict's nonpunishable status or "disease,"9 or that they are involuntary
effects or symptoms of that status. 10 On the basis of such arguments
some have urged that the Robinson immunity should be extended
beyond the minimalist interpretation to include the addict's nontraf-
ficking use, possession and purchase of his drug; others would go
farther and include offenses motivated by addiction, such as theft."
narcotic, as distinguished from act of using drug, not cruel and unusual punishment);
Rengel v. State, 444 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (no error to refuse to instruct jury
to render verdict of not guilty of possession of narcotics merely because appellant was
admitted and known addict). See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); United States v.
Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
7. The term is used here to mean immunity from criminal liability either on the
ground that mens rea is absent or on the ground that addiction functions as a defense.
Whether exculpation takes the former or the latter form is undoubtedly significant both
in terms of litigation strategy and in terms of the consequences of a finding of "not
guilty." See Goldstein & Katz, Abolish The "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J.
853 (1963). Such discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
8. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 554 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting); United States v.
Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1236 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973) (vacation of
sentences, but not exculpation, for narcotics addict convicted under federal statute for
possession of narcotics) (Wright, J., dissenting); United States v. Carter, 436 F.2d 200 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (conviction upheld where substantial testimony that defendant's alleged mental
illness and narcotic addiction not causally connected with commission of robbery and
assault) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(insanity plea issue properly submitted to jury where plea made by narcotics addict);
Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (chronic alcoholism resulting
in public intoxication not a crime; holding severely limited by Powell v. Texas, supra);
Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) (statute punishing public drunkenness
could not be applied to chronic alcoholic; holding severely limited by Powell v. Texas,
supra); Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
894 (1965) (ten-year sentence for heroin addict convicted of narcotics trafficking not cruel
and unusual punishment) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lloyd
v. United States, 343 F.2d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952 (1964) (denial of
petition for rehearing for addict convicted for sale of narcotics) (Bazelon, C.T., dissenting);
United States v. Lindsey, 324 F. Supp. 55, 59-60 (D.D.C. 1971) (defendant unable to show
inability to abstain from narcotic drugs which would eliminate mens rea for nontraffick-
ing possession of narcotic drug); United States v. Ashton, 317 F. Supp. 860 (D.D.C. 1970)
(no liability for addict's nontrafficking possession of drugs); People v. Malloy, 58 Misc. 2d
538, 296 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Crim. Ct. 1968) (cruel and unusual punishment to charge certified
addict with felony of escape when he is voluntarily incarcerated under valid civil com-
mitment order for treatment).
9. See Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (McGowan, J.).
10. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 567 (1965) (Fortas, J., dissenting); Easter v.
District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding severely limited by Powell v.
Texas, supra); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764-65 (4th Cir. 1966) (holding severely
limited by Powell v. Texas, supra).
11. Most of the debate has focused on nontrafficking use, purchase and possession. At
one end of the spectrum a state court held that Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962), did not even cover an addict's "being under the influence" of the drug. State v.
Margo, 40 N.J. 188, 191 A.2d 431 (1963). At the other end, Judge Bazelon has argued for
immunity on the broadest grounds. United States v. Carter, 436 F.2d 200, 202 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). For a direct expression of disagreement among those
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In Powell v. Texas,12 decided six years after Robinson, the Court
again addressed these issues in four separate opinions. Four dissenting
Justices argued that Robinson and common law principles rendered
an alcoholic immune from criminal punishment for public drunken-
ness by virtue of his addictiti. 13 Four Justices in the majority rejected
this reasoning in affirming the appellant's conviction.14 The fifth,
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, seemed to support immunity
from criminal punishment for the chronic alcoholic's drinking or being
drunk, but he found that the factual record in the case could not sup-
port exculpation based on that principle. 15 In 1970 the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia seemed close to a consensus
that would clear up this confusion. In Watson v. United States"6 that
court announced that a nontrafficking addict presenting a better factual
record than appeared in the case before it ought to be able to invoke
Robinson to win immunity from punishment for possession. But when
the issue arose again in 1973 the same court rejected, in a five-to-four
who would extend the scope of Robinson v. California, supra, compare United States v.
Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part), with 486 F.2d at 1236 (Wright, J., dissenting).
The extensive case law debates over Robinson are paralleled by extensive discussion in
journal literature. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of
Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers,
and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205 (1967); Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40
S. CAL. L. REV. 463 (1967); Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process
Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322 (1966); McKevitt, The "Un-
touchable" Acts of Addiction, 55 A.B.A.J. 454 (1969); McMorris, Can We Punish For the
Acts of Addiction?, 54 A.B.A.J. 1081 (1968); Note, Criminal Law: Demise of "Status''-
"Act" Distinction in Symptomatic Crimes of Narcotic Addiction, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1053;
Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79
HARv. L. REV. 635 (1966); Note, Punishment of Narcotics Addicts for Possession: A Cruel
But Usual Punishment, 56 IowA L. REV. 578 (1971). Legal commentators generally ap-
prove extension beyond the minimalist reading of Robinson to provide immunity from
criminal punishment at least for the addict's nontrafficking use, possession, and pur-
chase of the drug.
12. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
13. Id. at 584 (Fortas, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, Brennan, & Stewart, JJ.).
14. Id. at 514 (Marshall, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Black & Harlan, JJ.).
15. Id. at 552-54 (White, J., concurring).
See In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (cruel and un-
usual punishment to prohibit consideration of parole for a minimum period of ten years
where addict convicted of furnishing heroin had a record of a prior heroin possession
conviction). The court noted that, although statutes providing for increased penalties for
habitual offenders are generally justified, in the case of the addict one must take into
account the fact that the repetition of drug offenses may be "attributable solely to a
psychological and/or physiological compulsion arising from an addiction." Id. at 916, 519
P.2d at 1079, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 656. The court notes that the penalty it strikes down falls
somewhere between sanctions for status prohibited under Robinson, and the sanctions
for overt acts that result from addiction, permissible under Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968). Foss, apparently, can be punished for his second offense, since it was an "overt
act," but not for the fact that it is a second offense, since that was a result of a "com-
pulsion" due to nonpunishable addict statusl The distinctions generated by Robinson
and Powell are thus so strained as to substitute metaphysics for matter in order to reach
exculpatory ends.
16. 439 F.2d 442, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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vote, immunity for possession by an addict.17 Some of those opposing
exculpation for the addict, however, rested their arguments more on
the current state of legislation than on a square and self-sufficient
rejection of the legal reasoning and factual assumptions of those favor-
ing exculpation.' 8
The present study seeks to dispel the confusion that arises in the
case law. The discussion begins with an analysis of the typical exculpa-
tory arguments that are based on Robinson. It will be seen that, insofar
as these arguments attempt to extend the immunity of the addict
beyond the minimalist interpretation of Robinson, they ultimately
rely on the assumption that behavior motivated by addiction is in-
voluntary. The discussion then reviews the factual background of
addiction 19 as it relates to the legal concept of involuntariness. It
demonstrates that the assumption of involuntariness is plainly unsound.
Finally, this study explores nonlegal theories of drug addiction in an
attempt to show that these cannot function as exculpatory vehicles in
the criminal law. All the exculpatory arguments, whether they originate
within or without the legal arena, lead to oversimplified "solutions" to
complex and ill-understood problems, thus injudiciously preempting
the legislature's role. Though they are intended to be humane, they
actually reflect a less humane, less realistic, and less helpful attitude
toward the addict himself than would their rejection.
I. The Legal Arguments
The principal lines of constitutional and common law argument
designed to preclude criminal liability where addiction is at issue are
often interwoven in the leading opinions. For clarity of analysis, how-
ever, the following sections of this article will distinguish them care-
fully and examine them successively. They resolve into three distin-
17. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
18. Id. at 1159 (Leventhal, J., concurring, joined by McGowan, J).
19. Unless otherwise indicated, I will be discussing narcotic addiction as an example
of the most acute addiction problem from the standpoint of the power of the craving and
the consequent intensity and persistence of the quest to obtain and use the drug. For a
discussion with similar conclusions in relation to alcohol, see Fingarette, The Perils of
Powell: In Search of A Factual Foundation for the "Disease Concept of Alcoholism," 83
HARV. L. REv. 793 (1970). I shall only occasionally comment specifically on other forms
of addiction (e.g., those involving barbiturates, amphetamines, tobacco, and tranquiliz-
ers), although I maintain that, so far as the criminal law is concerned, the principal
theses of this article and of the 1970 article, id., apply to all forms of conduct generally
collected under the rubric "addiction." For concise and authoritative standard descrip-
tions of the various types of addictions, see Eddy, Halbach, Isbell & Seevers, Drug De-
pendence: Its Significance and Characteristics, 32 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 721 (1965);
DeLong, The Drugs and Their Effects, in DEALING WITH DRUG ABUSE: A REPORT TO THE
FORD FOUNDATION 62 (Staff Paper No. 1) (1972) [hereinafter cited as DEAING].
Vol. 84: 413, 1975
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guishable lines of argument here labelled, for the sake of convenience,
the "status argument," the "disease argument," and the "involuntari-
ness argument."
A. The Status Argument: A Minimalist Reading of Robinson v.
California
The issue of "status" is central in Robinson. Referring to the statute
under which the defendant had been found guilty, the majority wrote:
This statute, therefore, is not one which punishes a person for the
use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for anti-
social or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration.
... Rather, we deal with a statute that makes the 'status' of narcotic
addiction a criminal offense .... 20
The Court found that the statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments: "We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus
afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic
drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there,
inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment."2' In arriving at this holding the Court analogized pun-
ishment for the status of narcotic addiction to punishment for affliction
with a disease.22 The analogy suggests that the term "disease" carries
an exculpatory force independent of that of "status"; alternatively, it
suggests that disease is a species of status and is nonculpable simply
because it can be so classified. This section of the disscussion adopts
the latter view; the former is discussed elsewhere.23
What, then, is the scope of exculpation for the status of addiction in
Robinson? Certainly the case cannot be read to do away with all crimes
of status. These have a long history in the common law and in statutory
law; they have not been fundamentally challenged by the Court.2 4 It
20. 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1972). The trial judge made a similar distinction in instructing
the jury: He noted that addiction, which the statute made a criminal offense, was a
"condition" or "status" while the "use" of the narcotic was an "act." Unlike the act of
using a narcotic, said the judge, the status of being an addict is a "chronic" offense that
"continue[s] after it is complete." Id. at 662.
21. Id. at 667.
22. Id. at 666-67.
23. See pp. 419-25 infra.
24. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 11; Cuomo, supra note 11; Lacey, Vagrancy
and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1203 (1953).
Vagrancy, for example, is often characterized as a crime of status. Although a number
of vagrancy statutes have been struck down for vagueness in defining the status, nowhere
has the claim been accepted that vagrancy is immune simply because it is a status. See
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Edelman v. California, 344 U.S.
357 (1953).
417
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 413, 1975
is implausible to read Robinson to announce a new constitutional
doctrine declaring crimes of status generally to be outside the scope of
the criminal law.25 The text and context of Robinson carry no such
implication, nor has any court proposed such a reading of the case. It
is therefore more accurate to read the case to bar punishment for status
only insofar as, and just for the reason that, the status excludes any act
at all. Indeed, a criminal offense, even though it may not itself be
conduct, must generally be defined with some essential reference to
conduct.2  In Robinson the majority emphasizes the absence from the
statute at issue of any requirement to prove that there was any drug
use, purchase, possession, or sale, or any antisocial or disorderly be-
havior resulting from drug use.2 7 In Powell v. Texas Justice Marshall
reads Robinson to stand for the proposition that punishment may not
be inflicted in the absence of proof of any actus reus.28 Many lower
courts have focused on the distinction between status and act in mak-
ing this, the minimalist argument. 29
Does this concept of pure status as distinct from acts make sense in
25. Amsterdam's exhaustive 1967 survey notes that the questions as to how to construe
Robinson with regard to status crimes have not even yet been structured. Amsterdam,
supra note 1I, at 240.
26. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 543 (1973) (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black notes
that this requirement applies even for "offenses most heavily based on propensity, such
as attempt, conspiracy, and recidivist crimes." See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE
GENERAL PART 1 (1961). In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972),
Justice Douglas's majority opinion quotes with approval An English opinion, Frederick
Dean, 18 Crim. App. 133, 134 (1924), that disapproves prosecution and conviction under
the Vagrancy Act where there would not be enough evidence to charge the prisoner with
an attempt to commit a crime. Lacey, supra note 24, at 1204, finds that many statutes
defining status crimes contain no reference to acts. But he acknowledges that in cases
such as "common thief" status, one can argue that "evidence of past conduct is neces-
sary." In analyzing these statutes it would seem clearer to distinguish between the status
(admittedly not itself conduct) and an implicit reference to conduct necessarily made be-
cause proof of conduct is essential to prove the existence of the status.
27. 370 U.S. at 666.
28. 392 U.S. at 533.
29. In these cases "status" includes no more than the mere physical and mental state
associated with desire. United States v. Rundle, 429 F.2d 1316 (3d Cir. 1970); Bailey v.
United States, 386 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Swanson v. Reincke, 344
F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965); People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d
903, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1963), appeal dismissed for lack of juris., 377 U.S. 406 (196-4);
Nutter v. State, 8 Md. App. 635, 262 A.2d 80 (1970); State v. Margo, 40 N.J. 188, 191 A.2d
43 (1963); People v. Borrero, 19 N.Y.2d 332, 227 N.E.2d 18, 280 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1967);
Rengel v. State, 444 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). But see the following cases and
opinions which challenge this use of "status" by arguing either that certain addictive
conduct inevitably and involuntarily flows from this immune addictive status or is in-
deed a part of the status itself: Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 554 (1968) (Fortas, J., dis-
senting); Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Carter,
436 F.2d 200, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); Easter v, District of Columbia,
361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); Hutcherson
v. United States, 345 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965); Lloyd v. United States, 343 F.2d 242,
243 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952 (1964); United States v.
Lindsey, 324 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v. Ashton, 317 F. Supp. 860 (D.D.C.
1970); People v. Malloy, 58 Misc. 2d 538, 296 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Crim. Ct. 1968).
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the context of addiction? Of course one may separate addiction status
(some distinctive bodily state or mental desire) from the actual use of
the drug by mere definition; the California trial court did so in Robin-
son in construing its statutory crime of "addiction."30 But some would
insist that the addict's purchase, possession, and use of the drug are
"realistically inseparable from the status of addiction." 31 In this view
California's definition of addiction is unduly arbitrary and unrealistic;
regardless of our verbal freedom to define "addiction" only in terms
of desire, the possession and use of the drug-and perhaps other acts-
are seen as factually inseparable from the physiological and psycho-
logical status of addiction.
Two arguments have suggested the forms this alleged inseparability
takes: (1) The addict's drug use is a symptom of disease. (2) The ad-
dict's use of drugs is an involuntary result of a status which is physio-
logical or psychological, or perhaps both. If the status argument is
pushed beyond the minimalist reading to exculpate other behavior
associated with the status, it thus resolves into arguments based on
disease or involuntariness. These arguments will lead us into complex
factual issues about drug addiction that will be explored later in the
article; we turn now to a closer examination of the arguments them-
selves.
B. The Disease Argument
Robinson opens the door to the argument that "disease" may pre-
clude criminal liability. Justice Stewart's majority opinion acknowl-
edges that persons addicted to narcotics are diseased or ill;32 the em-
phasis on disease is central to his argument. Justice Douglas's concur-
ring opinion asserts that the addict is sick, and that addiction is a
disease.33 Justice Clark's dissent speaks of "cure" and justifies con-
finement in a penal institution as "treatment." 34
Although the theme of disease has remained pervasive in case law
on the topic, its exculpatory force remains as ambiguous as it is in the
Robinson opinions.35 In applying that theme to the case of addiction,
however, the skeleton of the argument is discernible in at least a
30. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 662 (1962).
31. Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (McGowan, J.). See
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 686 (1962) (White, J., dissenting).
32. 370 U.S. 660, 667 & n.8, citing Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
33. 370 U.S. at 674, 676.
34. Id. at 681, 683, 680. However, Justice Clark insists that the issue which ought to
be central is the voluntary quality of the addiction.
35. But see United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting).
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generalized form. Its proponents would claim that it cannot be a crime
to be afflicted with a disease, that addiction is a disease, and hence
unpunishable. Others would argue further that some or all addictive
conduct is either part of the disease,36 "a compulsion symptomatic of
the disease,"3 7 or an "invariable"3' symptom of the disease; as a result
such conduct is unpunishable. Two questions must be explored in
order to evaluate these arguments: Can the claim that addiction is a
disease be usefully adapted to the context of a legal argument? Which,
if any, of the phenomena associated with disease are inappropriate as
grounds for punishment under the criminal law?
The first question is problematic because the term "disease" is
vaguely defined within the medical profession. 39 The term suggests
generally that a person manifests some distinguishable complex of
abnormal conditions having, or surmised to have, a biological basis.40
36. Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J.) (ap-
pendix to rehearing en banc).
37. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 569 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (quoting findings of
the trial judge with approval). Compare Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 433 (1974)
(Marshall, J.) with Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 526 (1968) (Marshall, J.).
38. Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J.) (ap-
pendix to rehearing en banc).
39. Although Jellinek, one of the greatest authorities on alcoholism, defends the claim
that "alcoholism is a disease," he admits that the proposition reflects a labelling decision
rather than a discovery of fact: "[A] disease is what the medical profession recognizes as
such." The term "disease" is a highly general, handy rubric, not itself the direct subject
of any scientific demonstration. E. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISm 12
(1960). For a discussion of "disease" as it has been used in relation to alcohol addiction,
see Fingarette, supra note 19.
Meehl stresses that even in neurology and internal medicine, "there is actually no clearly
formulable disease-entity model." Meehl, Specific Genetic Etiology: Psychodynamic and
Therapeutic Nihilism, INT'L J. MENTAL HEALTH, Spring-Summer 1972, at 10, 20. Typical
of innumerable medical texts as well as lists of nomenclature is E. THOMIPSON & A. HAY-
DEN, STANDARD NOMENCLATURE OF DISEASES AND OPERATIONS (5th ed. 1961), which uses the
word "disease" as a general rubric but nowhere defines or explains it. The terminological
difficulty is not overcome by shifting to the phrase "mental disease." Challenges to the
use of this term are widespread both within and without the medical profession. See
generally H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INsANITY 19-52 (1972).
40. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (22d ed. 1972) defines "disease" as: "illness, sick-
ness; an interruption, cessation or disorder of body functions, systems, or organs," or "[a]
disease entity, characterized usually by at least two of these criteria: a recognized etiologic
agent (or agents); an identifiable group of signs and symptoms; consistent anatomical
alterations, caused by specific micro-organismic alterations." McHugh, Psychologic Illness
in Medical Practice, in TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 107 (P. Beeson & W. McDermott eds. 3d ed.
1971) states: "The term 'disease' is difficult to define.... It is intended to convey the
idea that among all the morbid changes in physical and mental health it is possible to
recognize groups of abnormalities as distinct entities or syndromes separable from one
another and from the normal and that these separations will prove to have some biologic
explanation when the entities have been thoroughly investigated" (emphasis added).
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY D-47 (12th ed. 1973) defines "disease" as: "a
pathological condition of the body that presents a group of symptoms peculiar to it and
which sets the condition apart as an abnormal entity differing from other normal or
pathological body states." Those in the medical profession tend to use the word "disease"
even where they do not yet know the biological basis (if any) of the "disease entity"; they
will do so because they assume that one exists. Similar usage of the term in relation to
addiction avoids some crucial legal questions. See pp. 433-39 infra.
420
Addiction and Criminal Responsibility
If one seeks to derive a relevant meaning of disease by analysis of the
term "addiction," one confronts a plurality of concepts and definitions
describing addiction. 41 Moreover, these are used in varying ways by
various authorities within the health professions, sometimes overlap-
ping and sometimes differing significantly in meaning.42 Unresolved
questions, problems, speculation and controversy abound in this field.43
41. Jaffe, Drug Addiction and Drug Abuse, in PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS
285, 286 (L. Goodman & A. Gilman eds. 3d ed. 1965).
42. Experts in the field now avoid the term "addiction." DeLong, supra note 19, at 82.
For a brief review of these definitional inadequacies, see Lewis, Introduction: Defini-
lions and Perspectives, in SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF DRUG DEPENDENCE 5-11 (H. Steinberg ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as BASIS OF DEPENDENCE]. For a fuller review, see NATIONAL
COMM'N ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG-ABUSE, DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPEcTIVE
120-40 (2d Rep. 1973) [hereinafter cited as DRUG AMERICA]. See generally Eddy, Halbach,
Isbell & Seevers, supra note 19, at 721.
In 1964 the World Health Organization (WHO) formally abandoned the term "addic-
tion" and began to develop a more complex terminology. WHO EXPERT COMM. ON ADDIC-
TION-PRODUCING DRUGS, REPORT No. 13 (Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 273, 1964) [hereinafter cited
as REPORT No. 13]. Central to the new terminology was replacement of the term "addic-
tion" with the word "dependence." (The proposed terminology is now widely but by no
means universally used in the professional literature.) The Committee distinguished
"psychic dependence" and "physical dependence" and classified drugs accordingly. The
opiates and alcohol produce both kinds of dependence, and the study provides a set of
categories that characterize the degree of dependence, e.g., "overpowering desire" (opiates)
and "strong desire" (alcohol-barbituate types). In a 1969 Report, the concept "drug
dependence" is itself defined: "A state, psychic and sometimes also physical, resulting from
the interaction between a living organism and a drug, characterized by behavioral and
other responses that always include a compulsion to take the drug on a continuous or
periodic basis in order to experience its psychic effects, and sometimes to avoid the dis-
comfort of its absence. Tolerance may or may not be present. A person may be dependent
on more than one drug." WHO EXPERT COMM. ON ADDICTION-PRODUCING DRUGS, REPORT
No. 16 (Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 407, 1969). The definition is reaffirmed in a 1973 Report.
WHO EXPERT COMM. ON DRUG DEPENDENCE, REPORT No. 19 (Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 526,
1973).
The crucial concepts in the definitions of "dependence" (as distinguished from mere
use) are those of "overpowering desire" (the early formulations) and of "compulsion"
(1969 formulation and after). But no specific analysis or explanation of these concepts
appears in any of the official texts (nor in any other treatises I have seen on the topic).
The closest approach to such analysis is remote at best: In the 1973 Report, a section
entitled "Quantification of Drug Dependence" lists five very general categories of ques-
tions whose responses "may help to define the problems associated with drug taking and
provide a basis for quantifying the presence and intensity of drug dependence." Id. at 20.
Some authorities have tried to replace the subjective and vague notions of "overpower-
ing desire" or "compulsion" with more objective language. Isbell defines dependence in
terms of "persistent seeking and undergoing great risks to obtain the drug," use of the
drug as the chief means of adaptation to life, and a "strong tendency to relapse after
treatment." Isbell, Pharmacological Factors in Drug Dependence, in DRUG ABUSE: NON-
M EDICAL USE OF DEPENDENCE-PRODUCING DRUGS 36, 35-42 (S. Btesh ed. 1972) (vol. 20 of
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY) [hereinafter cited as NONMEDICAL USE].
Lewis, supra, at 8, suggests defining dependence in terms of observable withdrawal symp-
toms and behavior.
In this article the word "addict" generally refers, as indicated in context, to any one or
combination of the following: a person who shows distinctive physical symptoms upon
abstinence from a drug he has been using; a person who experiences a powerful desire
to continue using a drug as a result of frequent prior use; a person who shows through
behavior a persistent and intense commitment to seeking and using a certain drug, even
though lawfulness and analogous socially approved values must be sacrificed.
43. Authorities in the field agree on this point. With respect to the physical aspects,
see A. GOLDSTEIN, L. ARANOW & S. KALMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ACTION 605 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES]; Chruscial, Perspectives in Pharmacological Research on
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Thus it is clear that any claim that drug addiction is a disease is not
made on the basis of a consensus among researchers and health profes-
sionals about its manifestation. Obviously the claim that addiction
is a disease has its suggestive, rhetorical, perhaps educational uses. But
the controversy surrounding that claim makes it unsuitable as the
premise for tightly reasoned argument leading to fundamental innova-
tion in constitutional or common law doctrine.
Even if theories and definitions were clear and uniform, they would
not in themselves make clear which aspects of the alleged disease should
or should not be reached by the criminal law. In order to see how the
lines of argument would be drawn, we list the specific kinds of phe-
nomena associated with the rubric "addiction": 44
(1) Autonomous somatic states-specific neurological, physiologi-
cal or other bodily states that are effects of repeated past use of
narcotics, barbiturates, alcohol or other drugs, but which can exist
even in the current absence of the drug.
(2) Autonomous mental phenomena-the powerful desire for the
drug, and the related subjective sensations, that can exist after
repeated use but in the current absence of the drug.
(3) The autonomous and distinctive pattern of behavior-the
pattern of repeated, persistent, illegal use of the drug, and other
behavior distinctively belonging to this pattern, even in the ab-
sence of the drug.
It is evident that a minimalist reading of Robinson forbids criminal
punishment for the existence of the pure status phenomena included
in the first category, mere somatic states per se. The phenomena in
the second category, mere mental propensities or desires, are similarly
protected. Thus insofar as a disease theory of addiction suggests the
existence of autonomous bodily and mental states, criminal immunity
is exactly coextensive with that arising from the minimalist reading of
the status argument.
If the disease argument is to broaden the scope of criminal immunity
Drug Dependence, in NONMEDICAL UsE, supra note 42, at 79; Jaffe, supra note 41, at 283.
With respect to addictive life patterns, see DeLong, supra note 19, at 79-81; Jaffe, The
Implementation and Evaluation of New Treatments for Compulsive Drug Users, in DRuG
DEPENDENCE 230-32 (R. Harris, W. Mclsaac & C. Shuster eds. 1970); DRUG AMERCA, supra
note 42, at 369-70. See generally note 96 infra.
Preble and Casey's summary of the various historic phases of heroin use from World
War I to the present notes how different they were. Preble & Casey, Taking Care of
Business: The Heroin User's Life on the Street, in IT's So GOOD, DON'T EVEN TRY IT ONCE
100-04 (D. Smith & G. Gay eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DON'T TRY IT].
44. This categorization is not intended as a definitive one but is formulated for the
purposes essential to the argument that follows. It includes each of the main types of
phenomena that authorities typically speak of as constituting addiction. See, e.g., REPORr
No. 13, supra note 42. The factual questions that arise in connection with these
phenomena are discussed in pp. 428-33 infra.
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for drug addiction, it must do so by immunizing the phenomena in
the third category, addictive behavior.45 Certainly it is inaccurate to
claim that all disease-related behavior can escape the reach of the
criminal law.46 The state can require a nondiseased person to take
steps to prevent his catching the disease;4 7 it can require the diseased
person to isolate or quarantine himself,48 or to take measures to protect
others.40 But the criminal law may not reach involuntary conduct,5 0 and
it is this assumption that has formed the basis for arguments for
criminal immunity for an addict's behavior.
Since the bodily condition associated with the disease is clearly pro-
tected by the status argument, the addict's conduct can be exculpated
only insofar as it is involuntary. Thus arguments for immunity may
describe the addict's behavior in terms that suggest involuntariness,
such as "compulsion symptomatic of the disease." 5' 1 Legal involuntari-
ness, however, must be demonstrated as a matter of fact no matter how
the conduct is related to the protected disease status.
The claim that addictive behavior is a "symptom" of the disease thus
amounts to an attempt to gloss over the issue of involuntariness. There
is no reason to assume that whatever is a medically recognized symptom
must be legally involuntary. A symptom is simply an indicator or
manifestation of disease.5 2 There are some kinds of behavior that can
be symptomatic movements of the body and that are not directly sub-
45. See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1236 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
46. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1897);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859, 861 (Okla.
Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1954). See note 27 supra.
47. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1905) (vaccination).
48. See id. at 25; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1897). Compagnie Francaise v.
Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1901).
49. The classic situation involves a driving prohibition for those who know they may
lose control because of their disease. Failure to observe reasonable precautions to protect
others from such dangers can warrant criminal conviction if, for example, another
person's death results. People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 110, 142 P.2d 435 (1943); People v.
Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1956).
50. M. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 25, at 130 (1972).
51. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 569 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (quoting trial judge
with approval); Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon. C.J.)
(appendix to rehearing en banc) ("Even if an addict retains some minimal 'free will' not
to indulge at a particular moment in time, no, one would deny that his use of narcotics is
largely involuntary-indeed is the essence of his disease"). See In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910,
922, 519 P.2d 1073, 1080, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 656 (1974) ("psychological and/or physio-
logical compulsion arising from an addiction").
52. STEDMIAN'S MEDICAL DICTnONARY, supra note 40, at 1231 defines "symptom" as:
"Any morbid phenomenon or departure from the normal in function, appearance, or
sensation experienced by the patient and indicative of disease." E. DE COWIN 9 R. DE
GOwIN, DIACNOsrIC EXAtINATION (2d ed. 1969) says: "Symptoms are those variations from
normal sensations or behavior that enter the patient's consciousness. They are subjective
.... Physical examination discloses physical signs; these are objective manifestations of
disease...." TABOR'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICrIONARY, supra note 40, at 5-140 says: "Any
perceptible change in the body or its functions that indicates disease or the kind or
phases of disease."
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ject to the will in certain situations-e.g., fainting, tics, or squints. But
there are also behaviors that can be symptomatic in medical terms and
that can be directly subject to the will. 3 It is, then, a question of fact
and not of definition whether symptomatic behavior is voluntary.
Where a symptom is a voluntary act, there is no legal basis for declaring
that merely because it indicates or manifests a disease, the person can-
not be punished for it. Indeed, if such a voluntary act could cause
serious social harm, is there any doubt that the state could invoke the
criminal law to prohibit it?
One variant of the disease argument deserves particular mention at
this point; it is the claim, explicit or implied, that addiction is a
mental disease.54 If this is meant to advance the argument by invoking
the insanity defense, it only makes the addict's attempt to escape
liability more burdensome: the defendant would have to prove both
the existence of a mental disease and either a lack of understanding
related to the offending act itself,55 or a defect in volitional capac-
ity.56 Proof that addiction is a mental disease would be difficult; there
53. One large category of symptomatic behaviors subject to voluntary control includes
partial paralyses or failures of bodily coordination symptomatic of various kinds of
neurological or other organic disease or defect. The behavioral malfunction is commonly
both evident and symptomatic, but sufficiently limited in degree to be subject to a
positive effort of will. For example, in cases where diverging eyes have resulted from par-
tial paralysis of a muscle of one of the eyes, a partial closing of one eye is a typical symp-
tomatic behavior; it can be reversed with some attention and moderate effort of will. The
double vision that is distinctively symptomatic of this condition can also be elicited or
prevented at will by those who have sufficient use of the muscle to relax it or to activate
it sufficiently. 6 S. DUKE-ELDER, SYSTEM OF OPHTHALMOLOGY 617 (1958). For other examples
of partial paralyses influenceable by effort of will and of voluntary exercises recom-
mended to help in therapy, see the medical treatment discussion of Bell's palsy, and of
paralyses due to cerebrovascular accidents in HAVARD, CURRENT MEDICAL TREATMENT 454,
460 (3d ed. 1970).
54. Fifty years ago, when people spoke of "dope fiends," it was possible for a court to
accept the notion that a morphine addict was per se insane. Prather v. Commonwealth,
215 Ky. 714, 287 S.W. 559 (1926). More recently the claim that addiction is a mental
disease had been put forth by defendant addicts either as a generalized claim, Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 n.8, or with respect to the particular case at issue. Gaskins
v. United States, 410 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rivers v. United States. 330 F.2d 841
(D.C. Cir. 1964). See Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965) (Burger, J., concurring); Horton v. United States, 317 F.2d
595, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1963); note 58, infra.
55. In M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843) this lack of understanding is
formulated as a defect of reason from disease of the mind, such that "[the accused did
not] know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong." This requirement appears as one option
for proof of insanity in the MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), and
is described as a defect resulting from mental disease wherein the person "lacks sub-
stantial capacity ... to appreciate the criminality of his conduct."
56. In Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897) the Court described this defect
as a condition in which "[the] will .... the governing power of his mind, has been other-
wise than voluntarily so completely destroyed that his actions are not subject to it, but
are beyond his control." The MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962),
describes this aspect of the insanity defense as an optional alternative to the ground
described in note 55 supra. Here the defendant "lacks substantial capacity ... to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law." Any trend toward allowing a mere showing that
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is no consensus in the medical profession that addiction is a mental
disease.57 Although courts have shown sympathy for the doctrine that
addiction is a disease, they have consistently refused to adopt the
doctrine that addiction is a mental diseasers Moreover, the very con-
cept of mental disease has been under severe scientific attack and is
now plainly a controversial one.59 But assume the defendant estab-
lishes that addiction is a mental disease. If he is being tried for use,
possession, or addiction-related theft, for example, the issue of a lack
of understanding is unlikely to arise. If an addict committed an act
while under the influence of a drug, any resulting lack of understand-
ing would not suffice to establish the insanity defense; such a lack of
understanding would not result from the "disease" of addiction, but
from the act of taking the drug. Thus, proof of defective volition
would still be necessary; the addict would have to show that he was
unable to exert the self-control necessary to refrain from drug use. Use
of the insanity defense therefore does not avoid the necessity of show-
ing involuntariness; that proof is only one part of the case such a
defendant would have to make.
In summary, the disease argument relies on two assumptions in at-
tempting to exculpate the addict. First, it suggests that his psychological
and physiological condition, a pure status, is not punishable; this sug-
the offending act resulted from mental disease, without a specific showing of lack of
knowledge or lack of free will, collapsed with the abandonment of the rule of Durham v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (act must be product of mental disease or
defect) in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (adoption of Model
Penal Code test). See generally H. FINGARETrE, supra note 39; A. GOLDSrEIN, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE (1967).
57. See notes 41-43 supra; H. FINGARETTE, supra note 39, at 19-52. Such a consensus
would not in any event control the legal concept of "disease" or "defect" as applied in
the insanity defense. See MacDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
superseded by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (1972). See also Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 541 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
58. Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Burger, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967). Robinson does not assert more than that addiction is a
disease, though there is a footnote quoting (without direct comment or clear contextual
indication of attitude) the appellee's brief which claimed that heroin addiction is a "state
of mental and physical illness." 370 U.S. at 666 n.8. Courts have also stated that "a mere
showing of narcotics addiction, without more does not constitute 'some evidence' of
mental disease...." Bailey v. United States, 386 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1967), citing Heard v.
United States, 348 F.2d 43, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Collins, 443 F.2d
550 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Hutcherson v.
United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965); Lloyd v. United
States, 343 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952 (1964); People v. Borrero, 19
N.Y.2d 332, 227 N.E.2d 18 (1967). Of course, an addict may make an insanity plea and
a showing of mental disease independent of a claim of addiction. This strategy may
succeed in a case where addiction exists but the addiction per se is not in itself sufficient
even to raise the insanity issue. Castle v. United States, supra, at 494 (Wright, J.); id. at
496-97 (Burger, J., concurring). This approach was used successfully in People v. Kelly,
10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973). But see Prather v. Commonwealth,
215 Ky. 714, 287 S.W. 559 (1926) (morphine addict held insane because of addictive status).
59. See generally H. FINGARETE, supra note 39, at 19-52.
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gestion is unnecessary because it merely argues the minimalist holding
in Robinson. Second, it implies that addictive behavior is involuntary.
The latter suggestion has been made even more directly in the case
law and is explored below.
C. The Involuntariness Argument
While Robinson contains only a brief and cryptic allusion to the
involuntariness issue,60 other cases have extended its implications to
introduce directly considerations of involuntariness in ways that would
seem to exculpate addictive behavior. Sometimes the argument is that
the addictive behavior in question is involuntary;0 1 sometimes it takes
the more complex form that the addictive behavior is the involuntary
result of a nonpunishable status.62 Some forms of the argument use
the word "involuntary," 63 some the term "compulsion," 64 and some
the term "pharmacological duress." 65 Usually the involuntariness is
said to extend to nontrafficking use, possession, and purchase; some-
times it is said to extend to behavior such as theft, if motivated by the
need for money for a personal supply of the drug.66 The theme of in-
voluntariness has also been pressed vigorously in connection with ad-
diction to alcohol. The premise proposed in the Powell dissent, and in
the decisions in similarly inclined cases, is that alcoholism is a disease
60. 370 U.S. at 667. The Court offers two examples in which addiction may result
involuntarily. One is the addiction resulting from medically prescribed narcotics, the
other is the newborn infant's addiction resulting from the mother's addiction. Both are
not only examples of rare types of addiction relative to the total addict population, but
are also examples of innocent development of addiction rather than innocent subsequent,
self-initiated use of the drug once addiction exists. It is the ability to refrain from use
subsequent to addiction that is most commonly at issue when the assumption of the
involuntariness of addict behavior is discussed. The Robinson majority opinion says
nothing at all on that score, as Judge Wilkey notes in United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d
1139 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
61. See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
980 (1973) ('Wright, J., dissenting).
62. See Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (McGowan, J.).
63. Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d. 442, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J.) (ap-
pendix to rehearing en banc).
64. See p. 420 supra; United States v. Lindsey, 324 F. Supp. 55, 59 (D.D.C. 1971).
65. Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 467 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J.)
(appendix to hearing en banc); Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967). See United States v. McKnight, 427 F.2d 75 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 880 (1970); United States v. Henry, 417 F.2d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1969)
("pharmacological coercion").
66. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980
(1973) (nontrafficking possession) (Wright, J., dissenting); id. at 1260 (trafficking and
robbery to obtain funds for purchase of drug) (Bazelon, C.J.); Watson v. United States,
439 F.2d 442, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J.) (appendix to rehearing en banc); Lloyd
v. United States, 343 F.2d 242, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965) (pur-
chase and possession) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Lindsey, 324 F. Supp.
55 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (nontrafficking possession). See Easter v. District of Columbia, 361
F.2d 50, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (being drunk in public; holding severely limited by Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968)); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966) (al-
cohol addiction, being drunk in public; holding severely limited by Powell v. Texas,
supra).
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that is involuntarily and nonculpably caused and maintained. 67 Yet
even where courts have doggedly resisted the exculpatory legal implica-
tions of these arguments, they often seem to do so without a firm logical
basis. This is because, paradoxically, these courts often seem to ac-
quiesce in the fundamental assumption of involuntariness, or at least
fail to challenge it.68
On its face the involuntariness argument seems to raise a simple
question: Does the addict have any control over the behavior motivated
by his desire for the drug? To answer this question we must confront
a set of deeply rooted myths about drug addiction. The legal issues
can be clarified only if they are reviewed against a carefully redrawn
picture of the factual background, one that reassesses these myths and
stereotypes. In the face of such an analysis the simple picture of the
narcotic addict as a slave to the drug disappears. We are left with
deeper substantive insight, but also with greater humility, appreciating
the extent of our ignorance, the complexity of the problems, and the
hopeless inappropriateness of trying to deal with those problems in
terms of a blanket concept of involuntariness.
II. The Factual Background
A typical layman's view of drug addiction is dominated by the myth
of the addict's slavery: In this view drugs typically associated with
drug-dependency have powers such that their repeated use even for a
short period will "hook" the user. Once hooked, he will be unable
voluntarily to abstain from use thereafter; he will make any sacrifice
to get his daily supply. If he fails to obtain a supply of the drug, he
will undergo excruciating withdrawal suffering. If he is forced to ab-
stain for a period of time-as a result of imprisonment or compulsory
hospitalization, for example-he will inevitably relapse into addictive
use upon his release.
67. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 560-61, 567-68 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting); Easter
v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding severely limited by Powell
v. Texas, supra); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) (holding severely limited
by Powell v. Texas, supra). See generally H. FINGARETT, supra note 39.
68. Smith v. Follette, 445 F.2d 955, 961 (2d Cir. 1971); Bailey v. United States, 386
F.2d I n.4 (5th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Swanson v. Reincke, 344 F.2d 260, 263
(1965); People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 906-07, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174 (1963),
appeal dismissed for lack of juris., 377 U.S. 409 (1964). If addictive conduct is in truth
involuntary, there seems to be no logical basis for the criminal law to deny the addict a
blank check to do whatever is necessary to get the drug. Any limitations on that license
would simply be arbitrary. The implications for the criminal law are "revolutionary" and
disturbing. 392 U.S. at 544 (Black, J., concurring); Powell v. Texas, 397 U.S. 514, 534
(1968). But see 392 U.S. at 559 n.2 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Judge Bazelon makes this point
eloquently in arguing that a poor and unskilled addict may have no "meaningful choice"
but to commit a crime. United States v. Carter, 436 F.2d 200, 210 (1970).
427
The Yale Law Journal
Greater sophistication will no doubt suggest that such an extreme
view needs qualification. But the main substance of the portrait is
widely accepted even in more sophisticated circles: indeed, the in-
voluntariness argument presupposes acceptance of the myth for all
practical purposes. This acceptance accounts for the widespread failure
of the courts to challenge the fundamental assumptions of the argu-
ment. This section of the article offers such a challenge. It reports a
number of basic factual considerations that cast doubt on the accuracy
of this portrait of addiction. The discussion focuses on four aspects of
drug use that belie this myth: the existence of a population of drug
users who do not become addicts, the successful elimination of ad-
dictive patterns among formerly addicted groups, the relative rarity
of a heavy physiological addiction in addicts in this country, and the
correspondingly widespread influence of social and psychological in-
ducements to addictive behavior.
The community's deep concern with the serious social problems
associated with addiction undoubtedly focuses attention on those rela-
tive few who do take up an addictive pattern of use, thus distracting
attention from the larger numbers who use drugs for medical or non-
medical purposes, but who do not take up such a pattern. Narcotics
constitute the most effective analgesics (pain relievers) known to med-
icine, and their use is a widespread and conventional procedure for
medical relief of substantial pain.6" Yet only a small fraction of the
many millions of patients who receive morphine ever qttempt to take
the drug again,70 and only an exceedingly small proportion of addicts
owe their dependence to medically initiated narcotic use.71 These
data alone prove that repeated use of narcotics does not automatically
hook users to continued use of the drug.72 One can make similar com-
69. See, e.g., Jaffe, Narcotic Analgesics, in PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEIUrICS,
supra note 41, at 247.
70. PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 474 (there is "no valid evidence" that legitimate
medical administration of opiates might "create" addicts); DeLong, supra note 19, at 79;
Lasagna, Addicting Drugs and Medical Practice, in NARCOTICS 55 (D. Wilner & G. Kasse-
baum eds. 1965).
71. Villareal, Recent Advances in the Pharmacology of Morphine-Like Drugs, in DRUG
DEPENDENCE, supra note 43, at 84; J. BALL, L. BRILL, R. GLASscOTE, J. JAFFE & J. SUssE,
THE TREATMENT OF DRUG ABUSE 19 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BALL & BRILL] report that
"latrogenic addiction [medically induced physical dependence] appears to be an incon-
sequential component of the drug abuse problems."
72. One important study summarized:
[I]n the population as a whole, very few of those who could obtain morphine or
heroin illegally, if they wished, become addicts. It is noteworthy that although D-
amphetamine has been used very widely to counteract fatigue and sleeplessness, only
an occasional person who used it became habituated to it. And despite the nearly
universal exposure of the population to the "legal" psychotropic drugs (alcohol,
caffeine, and nicotine), some become habituated and some do not.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 474. See generally Hill, Chairman's Introduction to BAsis or
DEPENDENCE, supra note 42, at 288. With regard to opiates specifically, see Geber, Non-
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ments about the sedatives and tranquilizers; these can and do come to
be used addictively, but only by a relative few of the many millions
who use such drugs.73
Among the minority of drug users who do develop addiction, many
give it up.7 4 Contrary to widespread skepticism about drug rehabilita-
tion, there has been substantial success in measures to control and
eliminate addiction in the United States. Skeptics probably assume
that anything less than 100 percent success in achieving total, perma-
nent abstention from narcotics as the result of exposure to any one
program is a failure and proof of the hopelessness of the task. This
conclusion is unreasonable and misleading. More important than such
total successes are the days spent free of drug use and the direction of
the trend for a population even though specific individuals may relapse
on occasion. Impressive achievement in these latter aspects75 is often
overlooked because attention is focused on the relapse incidents.
Dependent Drug Use: Some Psychological Aspects, in BASIS OF DEPENDENCE, supra note
42, at 375-87; D. LOURIA, OVERCOMING DRUGS 84 (1971); WVald & Hutt, The Drug Abuse
Survey Project: Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations, in DEALING,
supra note 19, at 5. Weil discusses the inadequacy of the "addict" stereotype and the,
individuality of patterns of use. Weil, Altered States of Consciousness, in DEALING, supra
note 19, at 333.
73. PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 474.
74. With respect to government and government-related programs created for this
purpose, see note 75 infra. Experience in private and purely voluntary residential programs
such as Synanon demonstrates that "many former compulsive drug users are able to re-
main drug free and to function productively so long as they remain in residence." Jaffe,
Development of a Successful Treatment Program for Narcotic Addicts in Illinois, in DRUG
ABUSE, DATA AND DEBATE 62-63 (P. Blachly ed. 1970). Unknown numbers simply quit drug
use of their own volition. DeLong reports that "there is some evidence that a substantial
number of addicts-perhaps as many as one-third-'mature out' of addiction when they
reach their 30's and 40's." DEALING, supra note 19, at 214.
75. BALL & BRILL, supra note 71; A. LINDESMITH, ADDICTION AND OPIATES 52-54 (1968);
Fraser & Grider, Treatment of Drug Addiction, 14 AM. J. MED. 571 (1953); Gearing, Metha-
done Maintenance: Six Years Later, I CONTEMP. DRUG PROB. 191 (1972); Jaffe, supra note
74, at 48-63. Maddux, Hospital Management of the Narcotic Addict, in NARCOTICS, supra
note 70, at 159-76. O'Donnell, A Follow-Up of Narcotic Addicts, 34 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
948 (1964); Vaillant, A Twelve Year Follow-Up of New York Addicts, 122 Am. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 727 (1966) (pt. 1); 275 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1282 (1966) (pt. 2); 15 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 599 (1966) (pt. 3); Wood, 18,000 Addicts Later: A Look at California's Civil
Addict Program, 37 FED. PROBATION 26 (1973). See generally Chapple, Somekh & Taylor, A
Five Year Follow-U, of 108 Cases of Opiate Addiction, 67 BRIT. J. ADDICTION 33 (1972);
May, Narcotic Addiction and Control in Great Britain, in DEALING, supra note 19, at
345-94. For discussion of alcoholism and rehabilitation programs, see note 94 infra. In
the large corporate anti-alcoholism programs, which tend to identify and deal with the
most advanced, chronic cases, recovery rates rang6 from 50 percent to 77 percent, averaging
66 percent nationally. Von Wiegand, Alcoholism in Industry (USA), 67 BRIT. J. ADDICTION
181 (1972).
In reviewing 11 follow-up studies of narcotic addiction treatment programs in 1965,
O'Donnell noted that high percentages of relapse were valid "only for a highly restricted
definition of relapse" such as a single occasion of use. The studies did not indicate that
"most addicts, after a period of treatment or enforced abstinence, relapse to drugs and
continue to use drugs, or that addicts spend most of their time outside of institutions
using drugs." O'Donnell, The Relapse Rate in Narcotic Addiction: A Critique of Follow-
Up Studies, in NARCOTICS, supra note 70, at 242-43. One study suggests that there is a
reduction in criminal behavior of patients in treatment. DRUG AMERICA, supra note 42, at
177. Such a benefit is obscured by the "all or nothing" approach to assessing results.
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A recent study of Vietnam veterans70 confirms the notion both that
addiction does not always follow drug use and that addiction can be
eliminated voluntarily. The Vietnam experience was "a natural ex-
periment in the exposure of masses of young men to narcotic drugs," 77
barbiturates, amphetamines, and marijuana. Pure forms of heroin and
other drugs were easily available, and at low cost. In Vietnam in 1971,
"almost every soldier had the opportunity to experiment with heroin
and almost all personally knew other soldiers who used heroin with
some regularity."78 In September, 1971, the study examined the entire
group of 13,240 young Army enlisted men who were then returning
from Vietnam. Eight to 12 months later they reexamined this group
with regard to drug use during the period following their return.
Widespread use was not followed by comparable rates of addiction:
Almost half had tried heroin or opium while in Vietnam, but only
about 20 percent developed signs of physical or psychological depend-
ence.79 Where addictive patterns had developed, voluntary nonaddic-
tion upon return home had almost always followed. Although about
20 percent of the total group of 13,240 had shown actual signs of ad-
diction while in Vietnam, only one percent of the total experienced
such signs at any time after their return to the United States.80 A
number of the ex-addicts among these veterans did use narcotics after
their return, but without readdiction. The study concluded:
These results are surprising not only in that men who report hav-
ing been addicted in Vietnam so seldom report any addiction in
the United States during the 8 to 12 months since their return,
but that many of them avoided readdiction without completely
abstaining from narcotics. The ability of men formerly dependent
on narcotics to use them occasionally without readdiction chal-
lenges the common view of narcotic addiction as a chronic and
intractable condition.81
The phenomenon is not unique to Vietnam veterans.8 2 The nature
of drug dependency in this country further belies the myth of addict
76. L. ROBINS, A FOLLOW-UP OF VIETNAM DRUG USERS (Interim Final Rep., Special
Actions Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, Executive Office of the President, 1973).
77. Id. at 22.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. Zinberg essentially confirms this finding on the basis of his surveys and inter-
views. Zinberg, Rehabilitation of Heroin Users in Vietnam, 1 CONTEMP. DRUG PROB. 263,
284 (1972).
81. L. ROBINS, supra note 76, at 13, 22-23.
82. See, e.g., A. LINDESMITH, supra note 75, at 48; Alarcon, Rathod &- Thomson, Ob-
servations on Heroin Abuse by Young People in Crawley New Town, in BASIS OF DE-
PENDENCE, supra note 42, at 338.
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slavery to drugs. It is highly unlikely that much physiological addiction
exists in the United States. Drugs sold illegally are usually highly
adulterated. In one survey of street drugs in New York, 10 percent of
the purchases contained no active ingredient whatever, and it has been
estimated that illegally purchased bags of heroin typically range from
one percent to five percent active material . 3 Thus, if we look solely
at the chemical factors involved in drug addiction in this country, we
find that the addict's strictly physiological dependence is at most
moderate and very often quite mild in degree.8 4
On the other hand, the social inducements to adopt addictive pat-
terns of behavior are often maximal. A very large proportion of new
addicts in the United States today are young, psychologically immature,
occupationally unskilled, socially uprooted, poor and disadvantaged.
Many engaged in crime before they were addicted.8 5 The myth of the
83. Louria, Hensle 9. Rosa, Major Medical Complications of Heroin Addiction, 67
ANNALS INTERNAL MEDt. 1-2 (1967). The reports of heroin "overdose" as the leading cause
of teenage death in New York City are probably a mark of impurities or special sensitivity,
since recent studies show that "overdose deaths" are not usually associated either with
high concentrations of the drug or with the usual symptoms of narcotic overdose. See
Cherubin, The Medical Sequelae of Narcotic Addiction, 67 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 23 (1967);
Chein, Psychological Functions of Drug Use, in BASIS oF DEPENDENCE, supra note 42, at
14-15; Wesson, Gay & Smith, Treatment Techniques for Narcotic Withdrawal, in DON'T
TRY IT, supra note 43, at 165 speak of the "monumentally poor quality" of the heroin
available on the West Coast. A summary of recent studies of "street" drugs shows that less
than 50 percent of samples surveyed contained the alleged ingredients, and doses varied
widely. Schnoll, Drugs and Therapy-How To Interpret What You Read and Hear, I
CONTEMNP. DRUG PaoB. 15 (1971-72). At one point the quality of street heroin sold on the
Eastern seaboard rose from about 5 percent to a 10 percent concentration; somewhat
more intense withdrawal symptoms for addicts resulted. Cohen, Patterns of Drug Abuse-
1970, in DRUG ABUSE 336 (C. Zarafonetis ed. 1972). Plainly local fluctuations are common.
This variation suggests that the persistence in the life-patterns is not a direct consequence
of the physiological action of a certain dose of the drug, but is highly influenced by other
(social, psychological, and cultural) factors.
84. "Because of [the highly adulterated doses generally sold] it is now easy to with-
draw the majority of heavy heroin users from their drug. Even those using six to eight
bags a day (a $30- to $40-a-day habit) often can be rapidly withdrawn without a sub-
stitute narcotic, by using mild tranquilizers during withdrawal." D. LOURIA, supra note
72, at 83-84. Discussion Remarks, in BAsIs oF DEPENDENCE, supra note 42, at 89 (remarks
of 1. Chein). Physiological dependence may also be moderate among members of the
"needle cult," addicts who seem to be addicted more to using the needle on themselves
(whether or not there is anything in it) than to the drug itself. See May, supra note 75, at
370; notes 99, 100, 105, 107 infra.
Undoubtedly there are narcotic drug-users in this country who are strongly dependent
physiologically as well as psychologically. One cannot say how many. No doubt significant
groups within this class are the health professionals who are addicts, and the "street
dealers." See, e.g., Preble & Casey, supra note 43, at 106; Discussion Remarks, supra, at 89
(Chein). Both groups have ready access to reasonably potent concentrations of drugs, but
far larger groups do not.
85. DRUG AMEmRICA, supra note 42, at 171-72; Vaillant, The Natural History of Urban
Narcotic Drug Addiction-Some Determinants, in BAsIs OF DEPENDENCE, supra note 42, at
347; Wald & Hutt, supra note 73, at 6. This is a common finding in many studies, but of
course it is related to the nature of the populations among which addictive drug use is
currently prevalent. In other epochs, other results would be obtained. See Preble & Casey,
supra note 43, at 100-04 (historical review); Weil, supra note 72, at 340 (cross-cultural re-
view). Similar contemporary statistics are reported from England. May, supra note 75, at
381.
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addict as a helpless slave to his habit only lends further strength to the
inducements for addicts to continue addictive patterns. It provides such
persons with a rationale for ignoring alternatives to crime and the
drug culture. Young people who are disadvantaged, and alienated, may
find the foundation of a socially authenticated identity in addiction.
For such persons, drug use provides at last a "constructive" focal
activity in life, generating its own occupational responsibilities, op-
portunities for success and achievement, social status, and ideological,
philosophical, or religious meaning."6 The "hustling" required by
drug addiction is not always a burden"' or a separation from a socially
productive life; for certain groups it may be one natural outgrowth of
the values of an alienated subculture, values that are by definition in-
consistent with those of the dominant society."" When some writers
characterize the addict as one who will seek the drug at "great risk" 0
or "at the cost of unbelievable sacrifices," 90 the sacrifice in question
may be one of values important only to the writer and not to the
addict. 91 A person who has developed roots in conventional society
and skills for leading a productive life is substantially less likely to
find a meaningful social identity in the drug culture, and such a
person can more readily abandon addiction once it develops.
92
Because addiction in this country has far deeper social roots than
physiological ones, judicious use of sanctions and threats of sanctions,
especially if coupled with suitable constructive aid, can be an effective
tool in deterring addicts from continuing drug use. Such sanctions
may be rooted in the powers of the criminal law; they often are under
present policies (e.g., revocation of parole, use of prison sentences). 3
86. R. ASHLEY, HEROIN-THE MYTHS AND THE FAcTS 73 (1972); Preble & Casey, supra
note 43, at 116. See generally E. BRECHER, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS, ch. 6 (1972). Chein,
supra note 83; Vaillant, supra note 85, at 351.
87. See I. CHEIN, D. GERAmR, R. LEE & E. ROSENFELD, THE ROAD TO H 360-61 (1964).
88. J. DOUGLAS, YOUTH IN TURMOIL 52 (1970); Feldman, Ideological Supports to Be-
coming and Remaining a Heroin Addict, DRUG DEPENDENCE 10 (March 1970); Chein, supra
note 83, at 23. See note 116 infra.
89. Isbell, supra note 42, at 36-37.
90. A. LINDE.SMITH, supra note 75, at 49.
91. R. ASHLEY, supra note 86, at 64 reports: "Most of what we learn about the heroin
user comes from the reports of the police, physicians, psychiatrists, and social workers. As
a group they are essentially middle- and upper-middle class, operating under a value
system quite different from that held in the urban ghetto...."
92. Vaillant, supra note 85, at 335, finds that addicts with a history of stable work
patterns and stable early family matrices were the ones who eventually became abstinent.
Von Wiegand, supra note 75, at 185, reports a two-thirds average national recovery rate
in the large United States corporation programs dealing mainly with advanced, chronic
alcoholism in career corporate employees.
93. These policies are employed in the California Civil Commitment Program and the
federal programs at the United States Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington,
Kentucky. See Wood, supra note 75; Vaillant, supra note 85; Carrick, The Government's
Role in Affecting Change in the Treatment of Narcotic Addiction, in DRUG ABUSE: DATA
AND DEBATE 136-52 (P. Blachly ed. 1970). Vaillant's 12-year follow-up of New York nar-
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Sanctions and aid may also be rooted in other values and institutions-
for example, in personal freedom, work or family.94 What is essential,
however, is that the addict perceive both the sanctions and the aid in
terms of his own values.9 5
III. Theories of Drug Addiction
In light of the preceding factual discussion, we now turn to a dis-
cussion of the main types of hypotheses used to explain addictive drug
use and to prove its involuntary nature. There are basically two types:
one explains addiction in terms of physiology, the other in terms of
psychology. It might be sufficient response simply to point out that
there is no generally accepted scientific explanation of addiction,90
cotics addicts committed to the Lexington hospital reports, "Effective treatment appears
to depend on the compulsory alteration of the addict's behavior for substantial periods
of time ... [A] long prison term [9 months or more] coupled with a year of parole was
vastly more effective" than short or long prison terms alone, or hospital treatment alone.
BASIS OF DEPENDENCE, supra note 42, at 355-56. A. LINDESMITH, supra note 75, at 52-58,
reports various studies showing that sanctions, parole, threats of job-loss or license-loss
(for physician-addicts) have produced significant results in producing abstinence.
94. For many of the narcotics rehabilitation programs, variable rules of internal
discipline allow increased personal freedom as the addict abstains from narcotics and
pursues work assignments. See Maddux, supra note 75; BALL & BRILL, supra note 71, at
63-241. Far more alcoholics in the United States have well developed family and career
roots than do narcotics addicts. Not surprisingly, the use of carefully worked out family-
job sanctions has been showing dramatic success in recent years in dealing with alcoholics.
Pfeffer, Feldman, Feibel, Frank, Cohen, Fleetwood & Greenberger, A Treatment Program
for the Alcoholic in Iudustry, 161 J.A.M.A. 827 (1956). See Mello, Mendelson, McNamee
& O'Brien, An Experimental Approach to the Drinking Patterns of Alcoholics, in BASIs OF
DEPENDENCE, supra note 42, at 259-69; Saslow, Where Do We Go From Here?, in DRUG
ABUSE: DATA AND DEBATE 247-48 (P. Blachly ed. 1970); Von Wiegand, supra note 75.
95. Lindesmith notes that introducing values that the addict accepts can positively
affect the successful implementation of sanctions. A. LINDESMITH, supra note 75, at 53.
96. See pp. 421-22 & note 43 supra. For an elaboration of the various types of hypotheses
that have been proposed to account for drug dependence, see WHO EXPERT COMM. ON
DRUG DEPENDENCE, REPORT No. 18 (Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 460, 1970). The generality and
range of disciplines covered by these hypotheses reveals the utter lack of specific, or de-
finitive causal understanding. They are cast in terms of psychiatric categories, delinquency
theories, miscellaneous personal motives (e.g., pleasure, distress and crises, social ambi-
tions, social rebellion), "metabolic lesions," conditioned responses and learning, socio-
cultural "pressures," and various combinations of these factors. Indeed, a later report
states that "these hypotheses are non-specific with respect to drug ise." WHO STUDY
GROUP, YOUTH AND DRUGS 20 (Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 516, 1973). In short, these theories are
all very general speculations about social malaises.
The analysis which follows in the text does not critically discuss the sociologically
oriented hypotheses. The assumption is that the existence of generalized social influences
does not amount to the conditions for involuntary behavior in the context of criminal
responsibility. It is true that there has been recent argument that for some members of
alienated subcultures the social influences may reach the point of establishing irrationality
and involuntariness of a kind justifying a finding of absence of criminal responsibility.
This novel and highly controversial view admittedly faces formidable obstacles to ac-
ceptance in law. In any event no analysis of the bearing of such a doctrine specifically on
narcotic addiction has yet been provided. See Floud, Sociology and the Theory of Re-
sponsibility: "Social Background" as an Excuse for Crime, in THE SCIENCE OF SocIETY
AND THE UNITY OF MANKIND 204-21 (R. Fletcher ed. 1974). There is good reason to sup-
pose that social factors are very important in understanding much addictive conduct, but
to say this is very different from saying or even meaning to suggest that the conduct is
therefore "involuntary."
The Yale Law Journal
and perforce no scientific basis for establishing that addictive behavior
is generally involuntary. But if we are to dissolve the myths that dom-
inate this field, we must go beyond this generalization and examine
specific types of explanations that promote them.
The first type of hypothesis is a qualified version of the simple
theory that mere use of a narcotic drug inevitably causes addiction in
all persons. According to this hypothesis, the physiological effects of
the drug interact with a biological, possibly genetically determined,
sensitivity found only in a certain subgroup of all users; for this special
subgroup the physiological impact of the drug suffices to produce an
addictive pattern of conduct.9 7
As a scientific or empirical claim, this type of hypothesis is specula-
tive, neither substantiated by medical evidence nor supported by med-
ical consensus;9 8 it hardly warrants reshaping constitutional or common
law doctrine. But even if these hypotheses were substantiated to some
extent, it is unlikely that such a biological predisposition could account
for a significant portion of drug-related conduct. Biological signs in-
dicate that many of those who demonstrate fullblown, extreme drug-
addict patterns of conduct are, at most, only moderately physically
dependent. Common addictive patterns of conduct exist in which the
known biological after-effects of the particular drug used are minimal or
nil.99 it is empirically implausible, in the absence of strong independ-
ent evidence, that a physiological influence so slight, even if related to
unique bodily predisposition, should absolutely and irresistibly trans-
form a whole way of life. A conceptual incongruity also pervades this
type of hypothesis, an incongruity in kind between the supposed bio-
logical cause and its supposed behavioral effects. There are, of course,
instances where a particular physiological process or directly associated
feeling may seem to produce an automatic behavior-response. It seems
plausible, for example, that intractable and overwhelming pain, or
97. See, e.g., Dole & Nyswander, MeLhadone Maintenance and Its Implications for
Theories of Narcotic Addiction, in THE ADDICTIVE STATES 359 (A. Wikler ed. 1968).
98. DeLong, supra note 19, at 212, summarizes the questions concerning the physio-
logical components of addiction and concludes that there are no clear answers and that
most scientists are at least skeptical about validating their effects. PRINCIPLS, supra note
43, at 474, raises the possibility that a genetic factor might explain the addictive response
in the relative few who become addicts, but acknowledges a "paucity of evidence" for
such a view. Specific comments such as those above are also confirmed by the more
general acknowledgments that medical science today lacks any accepted fundamental
understanding of the causes of addiction.
99. Addictive patterns of conduct are associated with the dependence-producing drugs
which WHO lists as not producing physical dependence, e.g., cocaine. The addictive pat-
tern of conduct can also exist when no narcotic has been used, such as in the not un-
common cases of addicts who have been unwittingly buying pure milk sugar from their
dealers over substantial periods of time. Vaillant, supra note 85, at 352.
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the last extreme of exhaustion or of hunger, may lead to a kind of
immediate, instinctive reflex, an uncontrollable sound or gesture. Yet
even in such cases, the notion that this reaction is a direct behavioral
effect of a physiological cause, that the mind can play no significant
role in mediating the behavior, may be factually incorrect. The bio-
logical drive of hunger can be influenced by cultural and psychological
factors. Indeed, eating can be suspended altogether to 'the point of
death by the mediation of mind, either by a voluntary hunger strike
or by neurotic loss of appetite. Recent medical research has dramatically
revealed how much even our extreme pain-distress reactions are psy-
chological rather than direct physical response.100
Yet even if one accepts the image of an automatic and involuntary
behavioral response to a specific physiological drive, this very limited
range of behavior does not constitute the kind of response that could
account intelligibly and fully for the typically elaborate addictive life-
style. A pattern of conduct must be distinguished from a mere sequence
of reflex-like reactions. A reflex knee jerk is not conduct. If we regard
something as a pattern of conduct, whether criminal or not, we assume
that it is mediated by the mind, that it reflects consideration of reasons
and preferences, the election of a preferred means to the end, and the
election of the end itself from among alternatives. The complex, pur-
poseful, and often ingenious projects with which many an addict may
be occupied in his daily hustling to maintain his drug supply are
examples of conduct, not automatic reflex reactions to a single bio-
logical cause.10'
Nothing in the preceding is intended to deny that chemical predis-
position or other biological causes may be some among a number of
factors significantly influencing addictive patterns of conduct. But even
if such causal factors were shown to exist, it would be implausible to
expect that they would be sufficient to resolve the question of the
legal voluntariness of the various kinds of conduct in which addicts
100. H. BEECHER, MEASUREMENT OF SUBJECTIVE RESPONSES 161-66 (1959), reports that
during World War II two-thirds of the wounded at Anzio did not wish pain-relieving
medication, whereas four-fifths of a group of divilians with far less tissue trauma did. The
gravely wounded who did not wish medication for wound-pain complained vigorously,
however, at inept injections. "Great wounds with great significance ... are made painless
by small doses of morphine, whereas fleeting experimental[ly induced] pains with no
serious significance are not blocked by morphine." Id. at 165. Beecher's experimental
reports show that, generally speaking, half the pain-relieving effect of morphine is due
to "placebo" reaction, a reaction to the idea that a pain reliever has been given rather
than to the chemical action; the placebo effect is greater as the stress is greater. Id. See
also A. GROLLMAN & E. GROLLMAN, PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 99 (7th ed. 1970).
101. "[T]hough drugs may have specific physiological effects, their effects upon be-
havior and experience are largely nonspecific." A. BERNSTEIN, L. EPSTEIN, H. LENNARD &
D. RANSOM, MYSTIFICATION AND DRUG MISUSE 57 (1971).
485
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engage. One must conclude that there is no substantiated biological
explanation of drug addiction nor is there a reasonable hope that
further research in this area could settle the questions of law concern-
ing the voluntariness of addictive conduct and ways of life.
It is therefore necessary to turn to theories that would explain ad-
dictive conduct by introducing psychological considerations: theories
of motivation, learning, or conditioning, or of personality structure
and mental pathology. We turn first to theories based on motivation.
These explanations of addictive conduct assume that either the drug-
induced euphoria or the addict's withdrawal stress or both provide
mentally overpowering motives for addictive behavior. 10 2
Some would emphasize that either the experience of withdrawal
stress or the fear of it can serve as an absolutely overriding motive' 03
for continuing addictive patterns of conduct. Immediate total absten-
tion from drugs, especially in heavy narcotic users, can be associated
with a temporary but intensely distressing reaction that includes chills,
muscle twitching, vomiting, diarrhea, and general debility. But "cold
turkey" withdrawal from narcotics, in and of itself, is apparently never
fatal; it is temporary, continuing at its worst for no more than several
days.' 0 4 Moreover, since most addicts are not heavily addicted physio-
logically, the reaction is not nearly so severe. 10 For the moderately
addicted, it is comparable to a bad case of flu.10 It is not uncommon
for young people who think themselves heavily addicted to find that
they can withdraw, "cold turkey," with only minimal discomfort.
01
And drugs associated with addictive conduct do not always produce
withdrawal stress.' 0 8 Most important, there is no need for "cold turkey"
withdrawal. The standard, gradual withdrawal procedures used under
102. REPORT No. 13, supra note 42, at 13, uses the phrase "overpowering desire."
103. See, e.g., McMorris, supra note 11, at 1084.
104. Glaser and. Ball, who studied the literature written since 1875, found no docu-
mented case in which opiate withdrawal was "the sufficient cause of death." Glaser &
Ball, Death Due to Withdrawal of Narcotics, in THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF OPIATE ADDICTION
IN THE UNITED STATES 287 (I. Ball & C. Chambers eds. 1970). See, e.g., Maddux, supra note
75, at 168.
105. BALL & BRILL, supra note 71, at 10. See p. 431, notes 83-84 supra.
106. Wesson, Treatment Techniques for Narcotic Withdrawal, in DON'T TRY IT, supra
note 43, at 165; Jaffe, Drug Addiction and Drug Abuse, in PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF
THERAPEUTICS 302 (L. Goodman & A. Gilman eds. 4th ed. 1970). See Zinberg, supra note
80, at 285.
107. Preble & Casey, supra note 43, at 110.
108. See Deneau, Psychogenic Dependence in Monkeys, in BAsIS OF DEPENDENCE, supra
note 42, at 199-207; Isbell, supra note 42, at 36-38; Villareal, Contributions of Laboratory
Work to the Analysis and Control of Drug Dependence, in DRUG UsE: DATA & DEBATE 97
(P. Blachly ed. 1970). On the other hand, it should be noted that physiological dependence
and consequent withdrawal stress can occur without psychological dependence, without
the self-conscious craving to use the drug and therefore without the addictive life pattern.
See Eddy, Halbach, Isbell & Seevers, supra note 19.
436
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professional care keep narcotic withdrawal discomfort to a quite
moderate and readily bearable level. 09
Furthermore, it is well established that withdrawal symptoms (as well
as the effects of drug use) are mediated to a great degree by mental
attitudes.110 Not only can the intensity and stress of symptoms vary
greatly with changes in the addict's state of mind and the social-psycho-
logical setting, they can even be made to appear and disappear with
changes in setting or circumstance."' Drug dependence facilities take
advantage of this fact: Increasing numbers of lay groups, therapeutic
communities, and medical and social welfare agencies provide a variety
of withdrawal and post-care settings in which the medical, social and
moral support is maximal.112
This discussion suggests that the experience or fear of drug with-
drawal cannot render addictive conduct legally involuntary. The crim-
inal law demands that citizens refrain from criminal conduct even at
the cost of temporary moderate personal discomfort; fear of such dis-
comfort alone could neither establish a criminal law defense nor an
absence of mens rea on the ground of involuntariness. Thus arguments
for defenses such as "pharmacological coercion""13 due to drug ad-
diction are fatally flawed. Such arguments implicitly reveal profound
factual misapprehensions about the assumed horrors of withdrawal
symptoms. The common law defense of coercion requires a showing of
reasonable fear of imminent mortal or grave bodily injury;" 4 only if
one erroneously equates the narcotic addict's withdrawal stress with
109. Blachly, Management of the Opiate Abstinence Syndrome, 122 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY
742 (1966); Fraser 9: Grider, Treatment of Drug Addiction, 14 Am. J. MED. 571 (1953);
Maddux, supra note 75, at 168 (withdrawal technique in U.S. Public Health Service
hospitals).
110. A. LINDESMTITH, supra note 75, at 34-39, takes it as "conclusively established" that
under controlled conditions addicts can be deceived into thinking they have received
opiates when they have been given placebos. See generally A. BERNSTEIN, L. EPSTEIN, H.
LENNARD & D. RANSOM, supra note 101, at 57-62; BALL & BRILL, supra note 71, at 34; notes
99, 101 supra.
111. Chein and associates report that the distress level in withdrawal depends on the
setting: "Alone, it can be an almost unbearable experience. In a hospital ward, remark-
ably little medication often stills the distress associated with quite severe physiological
disturbance, e.g., painful cramps and diarrhea. Conversely, patients with minor overt
symptoms may be very demanding of medication." I. CHEIN, D. GERARD, R. LEE & E.
ROSENFELD, supra note 87, at 247-48. See R. PHILLIPSON, MODERN TRENDS IN DRUG DEPEND-
ENCE AND ALCOHOLISM 1 (1970); Lennard, Epstein & Katzung, Psychoactive Drug Action
and Group Interaction Process, 145 J. NERvous & MENTAL DISEASE 69 (1967).
112. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 74, at 48. See generally BALL & BRILL, supra note 71.
113. Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 388 U.S.
915 (1967); United States v. Henry, 417 F.2d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1969). See Watson v. United
States, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("pharmacological duress," id. at 447) ("physiological
duress," id. at 461) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
114. D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951); Gillars v. United States,
182 F.2d 962, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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these dangers could a defense like pharmacological coercion have any
legal force.
Moreover, if courts were to make this erroneous equation they would
only encourage addictive conduct by validating the myth that with-
drawal stress is an agony to be avoided at any cost; the myth often
influences addicts themselves. 115 The belief in the myth of addict-
slavery can encourage addicts to surrender to, and even to embrace,
their "destiny" as helpless victims.1 10 This attitude can provide a
dimension of drama in a formerly drab or frustrating life. Such a belief
and attitude, often reinforcing counterculture values, provide a ration-
ale for pursuing a life of crime as a member of an addict culture." 7
Euphoria is another important effect of drug use that many believe
provides a principal motive for addiction."s It is obvious that in set-
tings other than addiction prospective euphoria is not a motive that
will normally serve to excuse criminal conduct. But one might argue
that anticipation of euphoria in the case of drug addiction could be so
intense that it could be shown to be overpowering to the point where
it negates voluntariness in the criminal law. Even if one strains to
entertain the logic of this argument, the facts are otherwise. The
narcotic addict typically does not reach or anticipate reaching such an
intense level of pleasure. Most addicts in this country cannot amass
the money, even through a life of active crime, to buy the quantity of
narcotics needed to achieve this kind of euphoria regularly. The "rush,"
which may be more common at stages of early use, becomes increasingly
rare with the development of tolerance to the drug."19 Thus a legal
defense based on ecstatic drug euphoria would simply have no basis in
fact. Nor could the prospect of the loss of tranquil euphoria associated
with routine drug use preclude criminal liability for addictive conduct;
presumably this motive would be even less overwhelming. 20
115. See Freedman, Non-Pharmacological Factors in Drug Dependence, in NONMEDIL
USE, supra note 42, at 30.
116. I. CHEIN, G. GERARD, R. LEE 9- E. ROSENFELD, supra note 87, at 248: "[A]mong
adolescent addicts ... the self-identification as addicts-i.e., as persons who require opiates
for comfortable functioning-is an important phenomenon in their developing addiction.
... There is another aspect to the withdrawal syndrome; it is not merely the bane of
addiction to opiates, but also its badge..."-a subject of much boastful humor and exag-
gerated story telling.
117. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 88; Preble & Casey, supra note 43; Chein, supra
note 83, at 23-24; R. ASHLEY, supra note 86, at 73.
118. See BALL & BRILL, supra note 71, at 21; A. LINDESMITH, supra note 75, at 34;
Maddux, supra note 75.
119. Holahan reports: "[T]he habit size of a long-time heavy user is often not at the
level of euphoria but only at a level sufficient to suppress withdrawal or to keep the
withdrawal mild." Holahan, The Economics of Heroin, in DEALING, supra note 19, at 290.
Other commentators confirm this point. BALL & BRILL, supra note 71, at 11; A. LINDESMITH,
supra note 75, at 23-45.
120. In the addict's routine daily injections a relief and calm is achieved. Each new
injection abates the tensions and discomforts that emerge as the effect of the preceding
Vol. 84: 413, 1975
Addiction and Criminal Responsibility
Human beings respond to conditioning that influences complex
forms of learning. Conditioning and habit-learning can operate with-
out the necessity for (at times with hardly an opportunity for) conscious
motivation or reflective choice or will. Could addiction be a form
of conditioned or learned "automatic" response that overrides the
conscious will? There is no empirical proof that simple pleasure-con-
ditioning or positive reinforcement in operant conditioning can of itself
determine a whole way of life.121 Of course a person may learn to alle-
viate certain discomforts by the use of a tranquilizing drug such as her-
oin that has short run, immediate effectiveness. That person may then
develop a strong, habitual propensity to respond to subsequent dis-
comfort this way. In the absence of strong countermotives, such as a
commitment to law or to other cultural values reflected in it, a person
who has been positively conditioned to desire and use a drug might
indulge this desire persistently, in spite of the illegality of the conduct
necessary to do so. But is it plausible that a person who has genuine,
urgent contrary values and commitments would find it impossible
either to inhibit such a conditioned or learned behavorial response, to
substitute another, or at least to take steps that would indirectly bring
about extinction of the learned or conditioned response? The avail-
ability of any of these measures122 could establish the legal voluntari-
ness of his drug use. The fact is that there is no independent empirical
evidence or generally accepted scientific theory that warrants an as-
sertion that human beings can be conditioned to the point where these
options cease to exist. Theories along these lines remain highly specula-
tive and controversial. 123
Yet another group of psychological hypotheses are based on claims of
psychiatric derivation. According to the arguments, whereas mentally
healthy persons do not allow the pleasure, fears, or learning associated
with drug use to become imperative or paramount in their lives, the
addict is psychologically vulnerable. He suffers from "mental illness,"
"personality defect," "character disorder," or psychic "compulsion."
dose begins to wear off. During standard withdrawal procedures, with decreased dosages
leading to abstinence, this tranquil "euphoria" is normally lost. Jaffe, supra note 41, at
302-03.
121. For a classic discussion of these concepts, see B.F. SKINNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
ORGANISMS (1938); DEALING, supra note 19, at 133-34. A. BERNSTEIN, L. EPSTEIN, H. LENNARD
& D. RANSOM, supra note 101, at 83, point out that the capacity of the many who reside
in such groups as Phoenix House to abstain refutes the hypothesis that addiction is an
automatic, internally triggered pattern. See Thompson & Pickens, Drug Self-Administra-
lion and Conditioning, in BASIS OF DEPENDENCE, supra note 42, at 177-98.
122. See Jaffe, supra note 74. See generally BALL & BRILL, supra note 71.
123. See, e.g., B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FRERDOMs AND DIGNITY (1971). Wald and Hutt
conclude that it is a high priority "question" whether there is any inborn physiological
predilection, drug-induced vulnerability, learned response to external stimuli, or none of
these, that bear on addiction. Wald &- Hutt, supra note 72, at 45.
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In response to these arguments, one might point to the problems and
inadequacies in invoking a generalized concept of disease (including
mental illness) that were discussed in an earlier section; we deal here
with more specific descriptions of mental illness and how they may
relate to the criminal law.' 24
For example, one writer reports that a large portion of addicts suffer
from "some form of personality disturbance .... [an illness often] man-
ifested by a pattern of anti-social behavior, rather than by observable
mental symptoms."'125 This concept of personality disturbance does
little to distinguish the addict from other persons who have a tendency
to get into difficulties with the law and with their neighbors and who
often manifest no discernible mental abnormalities. Nor is it a helpful
means of distinguishing addictive disorders to note that addicts mani-
fest personal failings of the sort found in the general population: "The
majority of addicts.., do not fall into clear-cut nosological entities,
but rather present mixtures of traits of the kind found in neuroses,
character [personality] disorders, and inadequate personalities.' '1 26
The psychiatric concept of "compulsion" is perhaps the most widely
accepted basis for an implicit argument that the addict's conduct is
involuntary. 12 7 The term means something different in psychiatric
usage than it does in criminal law. In criminal law "compulsion"
designates what is conceptually and observationally quite simple in
common sense terms: Either there is an exterior physical force greater
than the person's physical strength to resist, or, if one considers coercion
124. See pp. 424-25 supra. The general concept of "mental illness" has no more weight
than its more specific forms taken jointly. That is, if "compulsion," "inadequate person-
ality," "character defect," and other psychiatric diagnoses provide no independent proof of
involuntariness, the generic concept, which refers vaguely to some or all of these, can do
no more.
125. Bowman, Narcotic Addiction and Criminal Responsibility under Durham, 53
GEo. L.J. 1017, 1031 (1965).
126. Bowman, supra note 125, at 1033 (citing an AMA Report on Narcotics Addiction).
The labelling process can often simply obscure the legal issues. In Washington v. United
States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court was confronted with such a situation. It
commented:
These labels and definitions were not merely uninformative. Their persistent use
served to distract the jury's attention from the few underlying facts which were men-
tioned. For example, the fact that Washington's difficulties 'in relating adequately
to other people are more severe or more extreme than the average [person's]' was
immersed in a dispute about whether to classify these difficulties as a 'personality
defect,' a 'personality problem,' a 'personality disorder,' a 'disease,' and 'illness,' or
simply a 'type of personality.'
Id. at 449.
127. Redlich and Freedman find that this characteristic may be singularly descriptive
of addicts:
It is questionable, then, whether one can speak meaningfully of an addictive per-
sonality beyond the tautological statement that such a person, for one or another
reason, has the compulsion to take drugs. At present we are inclined to believe that
addicts are a heterogeneous lot.
R. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 728 (1966).
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to be a form of compulsion, there is a plain and imminent threat by
another person to do grave bodily injury or even mortal harm unless
the victim acquiesces. 128 In psychiatric usage the term means neither
of these things, but it does have several other meanings that cannot
accurately be used to describe addictive behavior.
Being "compelled" is often regarded as the result of tensions among
psychic energies or psychic forces within the individual.129 In the
latter usage, the psychic forces behind the addict's propensity to use the
drug are presumed to be quantitatively stronger than any contrary
forces. However, they are presumed stronger not because they have
been independently measured, but because the theory, post facto,
merely interprets in those terms the fact that the person engages in the
repetitive conduct rather than inhibits it. In this usage, compulsion
is a speculative theoretical construct about human behavior generally
rather than a scientifically discovered, distinctive feature of the in-
dividual defendant's behavior. 30
"Compulsion" may also be used in a more specific, descriptive sense
in psychiatry to refer to "an insistent, repetitive, intrusive, and un-
wanted urge to perform an act which is contrary to the person's ordin-
ary conscious wishes or standards."' 3 ' This characteristic definition
cannot apply generally to addictive conduct, however, since the drug
and the life are often consciously and wholeheartedly "wanted."' 32
128. For discussion of the legal concepts of compulsion, coercion, and necessity, see
J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1960). Of course a defendant could
try to prove that the psychiatric concept of "compulsion" implied a mental disease or
defect within the meaning of the insanity defense. Such proof would have to be made
independently of a showing of the mere fact of addiction. See note 56 supra.
129. The doctrine is set out in some of Freud's classic works, and is summarized in R.
REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, supra note 127, at 351. See generally C. BRENNER, AN ELEMEN-
TARY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 191 (2d ed. 1973).
130. The remarks in text above do not imply that these general psychiatric doctrines
have no use at all. They have uses within psychiatry; they can be helpful in gaining an
overview of the human psyche, in organizing the specific insights of the clinic, and in
guiding research and therapy. Moreover, the psychiatrist can make important contribu-
tions in certain aspects of the criminal trial. He or she may have insights into the mind
and character of the individual on trial, or at least into a well-understood psychological
type to which the defendant demonstrably belongs. However, specific knowledge about
addicts as a "type" is lacking, although vague, speculative, and often conflicting state-
ments abound in the psychiatric and other literatures. See R. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN,
supra note 127.
131. AMf. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, A PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY (2d ed. 1964). This definition
would not necessarily preclude a finding of criminal liability. As Justice Black noted:
When we say that appellant's [offending conduct] is caused not by 'his own' volition
but rather by some other force, we are clearly thinking of a force that is nevertheless
'his' except in some special sense. The accused undoubtedly commits the proscribed
act and the only question is whether the act can be attributed to a part of 'his'
personality that should not be regarded as criminally responsible. Almost all of the
traditional purposes of the criminal law can be significantly served by punishing the
person who in fact committed the proscribed act without regard to whether his
action was 'compelled' by some elusive 'irresponsible' aspect of his personality.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 540 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
132. C. BRENNER, supra note 129, at 191. See notes 86-94, 116-17 supra.
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Sometimes, however, psychiatrists define "compulsion" as an urge that
cannot be inhibited. 33 But on what grounds and in what sense can
one say that the addict cannot inhibit the impulse? Only two grounds
are ever offered: (a) the observation that the addict does continue to
use the drug in spite of attempts to threaten and persuade;13 4 and (b)
the theory of the balance of conflicting psychic forces; as noted above,
it hypothesizes that the urge that wins out must therefore have been
the strongest. But the latter explanation is only a restatement, in the
terms of the theory, of the observed fact that the individual does per-
sist.135 Neither formulation is an independent scientific determination
that the individual does so because he must.
Moreover, the question of legal voluntariness cannot be resolved
until we know, at least, whether the addict had the option of taking
some preventive measure that would have either eliminated the com-
pulsive urge or restrained him from satisfying it. These and other
legally essential questions are lost when courts employ too readily the
psychiatric term; such questions are simply irrelevant in the psychiatric
use of "compulsive."' 3 6 Indeed, psychiatrists themselves recognize that
the logical relation between the concepts of "psychic forces" in psy-
chiatry and "will" and "choice" in the law remains unclear. 137 How,
then, can the psychiatric formulations of "compulsion" warrant the
creation of legal doctrine that labels addictive conduct involuntary?
In the scientifically perplexing context of addiction, all these con-
133. H. ENGLISH & A. ENGLISH, A COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
PSYCHOANALYTICAL TERMS (1958).
134. The universal characteristic common to all types of drug dependence is psychic
dependence, a psychological compulsion to take a drug.... Psychic dependence is
difficult to define and measure but is recognized clinically by alterations in behavior
such as undergoing great risks to obtain the drug, obsession with maintaining a
supply, use of the drug as the chief means of adapting to life and a strong tendency
to relapse after treatment.
Isbell, supra note 42, at 361.
135. See p. 441 supra. The National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse
urges discarding of the "unidimensional concept of individual loss of self-control which
has long dominated scientific and lay concepts of 'addiction'" on the grounds that it is
simply inaccurate. DRUG AMERICA, supra note 42, at 139.
136. See notes 74-75 supra.
137. The eminent psychiatrists Alexander and Staub acknowledge the incongruity of
outlook in the two fields:
We may for practical purposes hold the individual responsible for his acts; we assume
an attitude as if the conscious Ego actually possessed the power to do what it wishes.
Such an attitude has no theoretical foundation, but it has a practical, or still better,
a tactical justification.
F. ALEXANDER & H. STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC 72-73 (1931) (em-
phasis added). See, e.g., Louisell 8- Diamond, Law and Psychiatry: Detente, Entente, or
Concomitance?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 217, 220 (1965). C. BRENNER, supra note 129, at 183,
acknowledges that the distinction between the normal expression of character and the
abnormal symptom is "necessarily an arbitrary decision" from the purely psychiatric
standpoint. R. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, supra note 127, at 350, say the distinction is
"very difficult or impossible" to make. See H. FINGARETrE, sup-a note 39.
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cepts of mental disorder are mere vague rubrics. They obscure our
vast ignorance in this area by imparting an aura of scientific knowl-
edge because of their technical appearance. At most they merely ob-
fuscate familiar facts: When we talk about "addicts," we often have in
mind persons with an intense commitment, one that seems unreason-
able and excessive, to a pattern of life centering on drug use.
Conclusion
In spite of a vast literature, professionals in the field of drug addic-
tion acknowledge that no satisfactory scientific understanding of drug
addiction has been reached. Thus there is no medical foundation for
adopting the general proposition at the crux of the exculpatory legal
arguments, the proposition that addictive conduct is involuntary. On
the other hand, massive descriptive evidence indicates that individuals
often make choices to abandon addictive conduct or abstain from drug
use permanently or temporarily. Moreover, authorities observe that
narcotic addiction often involves little in the way of chemical or bio-
logical influences. Yet it may provide an important individual or group
identity for many who lack socially approved skills or are socially alien-
ated. Popular beliefs about the chemically-induced hell of withdrawal
agony or the insatiable craving for ecstatic pleasures are profoundly at
odds with the facts, though they have deeply colored the thinking of
the courts. All this information forces abandonment of the argument
that drug addiction-and acts associated with it-be regarded as legally
involuntary.
Once we conclude that addictive conduct is legally voluntary, how-
ever, we do not express a basic substantive insight into addiction, but
merely free ourselves from a false idea. Courtroom clich6 has obscured
the fact that the problems at issue concern intricate and poorly under-
stood relationships that link character, personality, and mind to up-
bringing, social setting, and cultural values, and in turn to biochemical
and neuropsychological processes. Indeed, courts have been ill-served
by those psychiatrists who have promoted the notion that addiction is
involuntary and who have seen this notion as a legal formula that will
permit medical models to supersede the use of criminal sanctions.238
The very complexity of the problem calls for legislative determinations
138. This imputation of motive rests upon inferences that seem repeatedly apparent
as one reads the court records, and psychiatrists' statements about the irrelevance and
inappropriateness of the criminal law in the areas of mental disease and addiction. See
H. FINGARErrE, supra note 39, at 37-52.
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concerning rehabilitation, regulation of drug trafficking, 13 9 and the
general administration of criminal law in this area.140
Undoubtedly there are those who regard possible legal approaches
to addiction in polar terms: Either we inflict harsh, punitive and de-
grading measures on the addict, or we declare the person sick and
therefore not responsible for his conduct. What is needed here is the
abandonment of such extreme and fixed positions.' 4 1 In the present
antipunitive atmosphere in many enlightened circles, it is appropriate
to recall that the lawful and proper threat of sanctions may be not only
a pragmatically effective approach,'142 but also a morally humane ap-
proach. It regards the addict as an autonomous person, responsible for
guiding his own life, and subject to law. 1 43 The medical approach can
also reflect a humane concern, a concern for the weak and ailing and
for those who cannot, in some respects, handle their own lives. By now
it is no news that both of these approaches, however inspired, can in
practice disregard human diguity when ignorance, social prejudice,
well-intentioned dogma, lack of funding, or routinization take over.
We need to rethink the implications of both approaches against the
background of the limited knowledge that we have. Coordinating the
attack on the complex problem of drug abuse is preeminently a legisla-
tive responsibility. For the courts to assume that addictive drug use or
addiction-related conduct is involuntary and to build such an unworthy
assumption into constitutional and common law doctrine would be a
grave error.
139. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1159 (D.C. Cir.) (Wilkey, J.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 390 (1973).
140. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427-29 (1974) (Burger, C.J.).
141. A recent polar formulation reflects a common doctrinaire approach: "Medicine
views the drug misuser as a patient who needs treatment; law enforcement views him as a
criminal who must be punished." GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, DRUG
MisusE 12 (1971). Too often such a formulation merely sidesteps a set of complex personal,
social, legal, and spiritual problems:
Oftentimes ... the desire to avoid the implications of criminality while maintaining
formal control has resulted in compulsory treatment of an 'illness' which has never
been adequately defined. The Commission warns against the tendency to assume
that when its motives are benevolent, society need not attend to the philosophical and
constitutional issues raised by its actions.
DRUG AMERICA, supra note 42, at 257; Goldstein & Katz, supra note 7.
142. See notes 93-95 supra.
143. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT & REsPONSIBILrrY 23 (1968):
Criminal punishment as an attempt to secure desired behavior differs from the
manipulative techniques of the Brave New World (conditioning, propaganda, etc.)
or the simple incapacitation of those with anti-social tendencies, by taking a risk.
It defers action till harm has been done; its primary operation consists simply in
announcing certain standards of behavior and attaching penalties for deviation, mak-
ing it less eligible, and then leaving individuals to choose. This is a method of social
control which maximizes individual freedom within the coercive framework of
law ....
444
Vol. 84: 413, 1975
